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MINISTERS LIFE & CASUALTY UNION V. HAASE: THE NEW




In a memorandum decision handed down on December 5, 1966, the
United States Supreme Court sounded the death knell for the continued opera-
tion of the unlicensed mail-order insurance business by granting the appellee's
motion to dismiss the Ministers Life & Casualty Union v. Haase' case for want
of a substantial federal question.2 In effect, the Court upheld the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's decision that a state statute that both taxes and regulates
unlicensed foreign mail-order insurers is constitutional.'
The attempt to regulate and control the solicitation and sale of insurance
by unlicensed or unauthorized insurers is not a new problem for state insurance
regulators. As early as the 1880's, a committee of the National Convention of
Insurance Commissioners (NCIC) met to deal with the prevention of further
activity by such insurers.' It was then recommended by the NCIC that curtail-
ment of such sales could best be accomplished by requiring each state to prohibit
its domestic companies from engaging in insurance sales and solicitations where
such companies were not authorized to transact an insurance business.' This
solution generated only nominal support among state legislators, mainly because
each legislature was subject to local pressure and more interested in dealing with
local problems. Insurance commissioners hesitated to propose or enforce regu-
lations designed to benefit other states particularly when the company affected
was local and authorized to transact business in its domiciliary state. Several
other approaches were proposed by the NCIC,6 but nothing concrete was adopted
Dedicated to the late Wade H. English, former examiner for the Iowa Insurance
Department and a close personal friend, who after leaving the department labored long and
hard for the cause of mail-order insurance as the treasurer of the Iowa State Traveling Men's
Association.
The purpose of this article is not an attempt to compare the direct mail solicitation
system of selling insurance with the more popular agency system, nor to evaluate and there-
by favor an insurer's use of one system over the other. It is by no measure an attempt to lay all
of the ills of the insurance industry at the doorstep of the mail-order companies. It is simply
to show that when a small segment of a regulated business is permitted to remain outside the
scheme of regulation, the practices of a few unscrupulous operations will ultimately cost the
entire mail-order system its way of doing business.
** Counsel, Insurance Dept. of Iowa; B.S., Loras College, 1955; LL.B., Notre Dame
Law School, 1961.
1 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
2 385 U.S. 203 (1966). The question being whether the Wisconsin unauthorized in-
surance statute, Wis. Stat. Ann § 201.42, denied appellant insurance company due process
of law by subjecting the company to an action in a state forum in which it was not "doing
business." However, Justices Harlan and Stewart believed that probable jurisdiction should
be noted, and the case set for oral argument.
3 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 201.42 (Supp. 1967). Specifically, this statute prevents any, un-
authorized insurer from doing any acts that would constitute an insurance business unless
authorized to so act by statute.
4 For a comprehensive report on various types of abuses generally perpetrated against
the buying public by unauthorized mailorder insurers, see Hanson & Obenberger, Mail Order
Insurers: A Case Study in the Ability of the States to Regulate the Insurance Business, 50
MARQ. L. REv. 191-200 (1966). See also G. KLINE, REGULATION OF MAILORDER ACCIDENT
AND HEALTH INSuRANCE 48 (1949).
5 G. KLINE, REGULATION OF MAILORDER ACCIDENT AND HEAITH INSURANCE 48 (1949).
6 See Id. at 49-50.
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by the convention until 1938 when it approved the Uniform Unauthorized
Insurers Act. The general purpose of the Act was twofold: (1) to prohibit any
person from acting as agent for unauthorized insurers or to aid in any way
unauthorized companies in securing business within the state, and (2) to pro-
vide that the issuance or delivery of an insurance contract or policy to a resident
of the state was equivalent to an appointment of the insurance commissioner
by the insurer as its agent for service of process on any action arising out of such
policy or contract. Only a few states enacted legislation similar to the provisions
of the NCIC's uniform act.'
By 1941, the Laws and Legislation Committee of the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)9 had developed what it believed to be a
more comprehensive bill with greater powers vested in state insurance commis-
sioners.' However, before many states had an opportunity to adopt the NAIC-
proposed legislation, the United States Supreme Court, in the precedent-shat-
tering decision of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,"
declared that the business of insurance was "interstate commerce" and subject
to the regulatory powers vested in the Congress by the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. The Court thereby discarded the immunity long
enjoyed by the insurance industry from federal regulation and control implied
in Paul v. Virginia.2
II. To Regulate or Not to Regulate
A. From Paul v. Virginia to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
In its early days, the insurance business, particularly the fire and marine
insurance business, was highly competitive, and this situation led to widespread
abuses. 3 States, in their attempt to protect the public interest, passed regulatory
statutes designed to curtail these abuses. Such was the situation in Virginia
in the middle 1860's when Paul, an insurance agent, brought an action to
declare a Virginia statute regulating foreign 4 insurance companies violative
of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Paul v. Virginia"
provided a doctrine that for seventy-five years remained the lifeline for state
insurance regulators. The United States Supreme Court held that "issuing a
policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce,""' observing that insurance
7 Id. at 51.
8 Arkansas, Acts 1939, No. 181, §§ 1-9, 12 (repealed 1959); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1251-56 (1959); North Carolina, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 58-164 (1965); South
Carolina, S. C. CoDE ANN. §§ 37-261 to 272 (1962); South Dakota, S.D. Code §§ 31-3901
to -3906 (1960). The lack of popularity for this proposed bill was due largely to the fact
that it was not a product of the NCIC, but was presented to that group by the American
Bar Association.
9 The present name of what was formerly the NCIC.
10 NAIC Proceedings 147-48 (1941).
11 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
12 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction in
commerce).
13 See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 544 nn. 19 &
20 (1944).
14 In insurance terminology "foreign" means domiciled outside the state and "alien"
means domiciled outside the United States while "domestie" means domiciled within the state.
15 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
16 Id. at 183.
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policies "are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from one State to
another, and then put up for sale."1 The opinion of the majority was that
policies or contracts of insurance were "not executed contracts - until delivered.
. . . They are, then, local transactions, and are governed by the local law.""
(Emphasis added.)
The ensuing years brought strength to the Paul doctrine, and later cases,
using Paul as a foundation, went on to hold that the business of insurance was
not commerce even if carried on across state lines. 9 Through the years an
impressive line of cases,20 all adhering to or broadening the Paul v. Virginia
doctrine, created a distinct impression among state regulators and some industry
representatives that the Court in Paul had meant to restrict or even preclude
Congress from exercising its commerce clause powers to directly regulate the
business of insurance. This general impression was not only corrected in their
collective minds by the South-Eastern Underwriters22 holding, but remarked
upon by the Court in a later case: "correlatively [Paul v. Virginia] was taken
widely, although not universally, to nullify federal authority until ... answered
otherwise... .2 In this later case, Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin,
the Court went on to analyze South-Eastern Underwriters as a "reorientation
of attitudes toward federal power in its relation to the business of insurance
conducted across state lines."24 Through the pen of Justice Black, South-Eastern
Underwriters overthrew the Paul doctrine and the "attitudes" toward it by
declaring that insurance is commerce25 and, by applying the language in Gibbons
v. Ogden,26 held insurance to be interstate commerce subject to the regulatory
powers of Congress.2
While South-Eastern Underwriters was advancing through the courts, a
special subcommittee of the NAIC on federal legislation was formed. At the
December, 1944, meeting, the subcommittee reported out a bill2" to the execu-
tive committee that was shortly thereafter recommended by the NAIC to
Congress for passage. Nine months and three days after the South-Eastern
Underwriters decision, Congress passed Public Law 15, commonly referred to
as the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which to a great degree embodied the recom-
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 510 (1913); Hooper v.
California, 155 U.S. 648, 654 (1895). Deer Lodge reaffirmed both Paul and Hooper since
the Court again held the contract of insurance was not an instrumentality of commerce, but
a personal contract not a commodity.
20 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935); Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co.,
275 U.S. 274 (1927); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900); Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367 (1896);
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
21 See Brief for Health Insurance Association of America as Amicus Curiae, American
Hosp. & Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
22 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
23 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 414 (1946).
24 Id. at 414.
25 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
26 Id. at 550-51, quoting from Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189, 194
(1824). "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more; it is intercourse ....
Commerce is interstate... when it 'concerns more States than one.
27 Id. at 553.
28 NAIC Proceedings 18-49 (1945).
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964).
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mendations of the NAIC. Through the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress
declared
that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the
business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.30
Congress further proclaimed that "[t]he business of insurance, and every person
engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate
to the regulation or taxation of such business."'" Thus, the traditional system
of insurance regulation and taxation destroyed by South-Eastern Underwriters
was reinstated by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
B. Post South-Eastern Underwriters Cases
It was not until June 3, 1946, that the United States Supreme Court was
given an opportunity to comment on the McCarran-Ferguson Act. On that
date, the Court handed down two decisions,32 both of which involved questions
concerning the constitutionality of certain regulatory powers granted state in-
surance commissioners by state law in areas specifically covered by the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act.3
In the first case, Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin,34 Justice
Rutledge, speaking for the majority, held that a three percent premium tax
levied only against foreign companies and not against domestic carriers was
not discriminatory against interstate commerce and in favor of local trade. The
Court said:
Congress intended to declare, and in effect declared, that uniformity of
regulation and of State taxation, are not required in reference to the busi-
ness of insurance by the national public interest, .... [and] do not place
on interstate insurance business a burden which it is unable generally to
bear or should not bear in the competition with local business.3 5 (Emphasis
added.)
Commenting upon Congress' intention to delegate its power of insurance regu-
lation to the states, the Court observed that
it clearly put the full weight of its power behind existing and future state
legislation to sustain it from any attack under the commerce clause to
whatever extent this may be done with the force of that power behind it,
subject only to the exceptions expressly provided for.3 6 (Emphasis added.)
30 59 Stat. 33-34 (1946).
31 Id. at 34, § 2(a) (1946).
32 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Robertson v. California, 328
U.S. 440 (1946).
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012(a).
34 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
35 Id. at 431.
36 Id. The exceptions expressly provided for make reference to sections 1012(b) and
1013(b) which could leave the business of insurance subject to certain federal statutes-
Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Federal Trade Commission Act - if not regulated properly
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The' Court did not rely directly upon the McCarran-Ferguson.Act in the"
second case, Robertson v. California," because of the nature of the case."8 But
Justice Rutledge, in delivering the opinion of the Court, indicated that appli-
cation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act "would dictate the same result." 9 This
case involved a California statute requiring any person who acted, as agent for
an insurance company to be licensed by the state in order to represent the com-
pany. The Court held generally that the regulation of the insurance business
rested with the states. The reference to the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to
the language in section 2(a) that "every person engaged therein, shall be sub-
ject to the laws of the several States ...."
A number of less important decisions followed in the wake of Prudential
Insurance Company v. Benjamin, most of which dealt with some aspect of state
taxation. All were sustained as valid forms of taxing power granted the states
through the McCarran-Ferguson Act.40
Two other cases that deserve notation in the area of the commerce clause
considerations are North Little Rock Transportation Company v. Casualty
Reciprocal Exchange4 and Dart v. Mutual Life Insurance Company. 2 In
North Little Rock Transportation Company, the Eighth Circuit invoked the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and indicated that the Arkansas casualty rating law
did not constitute a "fixing" of automobile liability insurance rates in violation
of the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals upheld the Arkansas statute as a
proper regulatory function within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.43  The Darr case is important because it points out that the courts may
be reluctant to extend the states' powers to something more than existed before
South-Eastern Underwriters. In Darr, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that home office employees
of the Mutual Life Insurance Company were subject to the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938," since the products they handled, i.e., the insurance policies, were
produced for interstate commerce. In effect, the Second Circuit applied the
specific exemption set out in section 1014 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act4 and
refused to exempt insurance from federal control in an area that was not being
by the states in the areas of monopoly and discriminatory trade practices. However, section
1013(b) makes the business of insurance always subject to the provisions of the Sherman
Act as it applies to boycott, coercion or intimidation.
37 328 U.S. 440 (1946).
38 It was an appeal from a California statute making it a misdemeanor to act as agent
for a nonadmitted insurance company. Since it was a criminal proceeding on acts committed
in June of 1944, and the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not approved until March of 1945,
the ex post facto law prohibition would control. Id. at 461.
39 Id. at 462.
40 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 328 U.S. 822 (1946); Pacific Mut. Life v. Hobbs, 328 U.S.
822 (1946); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 328 U.S. 822 (1946). All of. these were per
Curiam decisions affirming the holding in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin.
41 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950).
42 169 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948).
43 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) exempts insurance from Sherman Act to the extent it is regulated
by state law, except for the provision relating to boycotts, coercion or intimidation pointed
out in note 36 supra.
44 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964).
45 59 Stat. 34, § 4 (1946). "Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to
affect in any manner the application to the business of insurance . .. known as the National
Labor Relations Act, . . . as amended, known as the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 .... "
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regulated by states. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in both
cases.
C. Summary
Although there are numerous other cases involving collateral issues of
state versus federal control of insurance and the boundaries possessed by each,
no decision subsequent to passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the
Supreme Court decision affirming that Act46 has been successful in eroding the
Court's support and validation of Congress' delegation to the several states of
the general power to regulate and tax the business of insurance. Considerable
controversy, however, has raged over whether the states' powers are limited to
the regulatory authority obtained and approved in the pre-South-Eastern Under-
writers decisions or whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act was intended as a
broad base upon which the states could develop an ever increasing amount
of authority to regulate and tax the business of insurance. This quantitative
question of "how much" state power was actually granted by Congress through
the McCarran-Ferguson Act becomes a crucial one when applied to the issue
of state jurisdiction over foreign companies transacting business on an unlimited
interstate basis. Did Congress really intend to make insurance regulation static
and fixed as stated in the congressional committee report which accompanied
the McCarran-Ferguson Act to the floor of the House?
It is not the intention of Congress in the enactment of this legislation
to clothe the States with any power to regulate or tax the business of
insurance beyond that which they had been held to possess prior to the
decision ... in the South-Eastern Underwriters Association case.47 (Empha-
sis added.)
Or were the very words of the bill sufficient in themselves to indicate that Con-
gress wanted state regulation to continue and be a viable force meeting the
tests and challenges upon the public interest constantly made by ever-changing
insurance products and methods of marketing?
III. Due Process-Doing Business-And State
Interests in the Contract
A. Limitations on Regulatory Jurisdiction
Whatever Congress' intent, the insurance regulators, through their national
association, proceeded to meet the responsibilities of continued regulation head
on by recommending to the states the adoption of certain model legislation.4"
Model laws drafted by the NAIC were an attempt by the association to pro-
46 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
47 H.R. Rap. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945).
48 All-Industry Casualty and Surety Rating Regulatory Act, NAIC Proceedings, 397-424
(1946); Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, see NAIC Proceedings, 315-16, 498-500 (1949),
also NAIC Proceedings, 165-68 (1941); Unfair Trade Practices Act, NAIC Proceedings
(1940); Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process Act, NAIC Proceedings, 169-71
(1951).
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mote uniform legislation in the several states in order to facilitate the operations
of the numerous companies that do business on a national scale. Today most
state casualty and surety rating laws are patterned after the NAIC's All-Industry
Model Bill. The Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Process Act49 has been passed
in all the states in substantially the same form as it was adopted by the NAIC. °
Both laws have been tested and upheld,5 thereby continuing to narrow the
areas in which state regulatory powers were kept at the level of the pre-South-
Eastern Underwriters period.
B. The Doing Business Concept
The problems of regulation have been compounded by an additional
complication. When Congress referred the regulation and taxation of insurance
back to the states, it was interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that the
states must regulate the business of insurance within the framework of existing
federal constitutional provisions.5 2 This has created a problem for state insur-
ance departments faced with the continued resistance, and in many instances,
total disregard by some unauthorized insurance companies to any form of regu-
lation or taxation, other than in their state of domicile. This resistance to con-
trol in states where an unauthorized mail-order carrier may have a large number
of policyholders is based on the old concept that no state has jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation if it does not meet the requirements of "doing business",
within the state, and, therefore, such a corporation cannot be subject to the
laws, regulations or taxes of that state. In the long-followed case of Pennoyer
v. Neff,"3 it was held that in order for a state to have valid jurisdiction under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the defendant was required
at least to be "present" and properly served with notice or make a voluntary
appearance. For a foreign corporation, "presence" was "doing business" in
the state, and the amount of contact that was required before such a company
was considered to be "doing business" became the gauge by which the courts
measured and determined whether due process has been satisfied.5"
What constituted doing an insurance business in a state by a foreign un-
authorized company was determined in the pre-South-Eastern Underwriters
cases by what "occurrences" actually took place in a state. Early insurance
litigation on "doing business," including what are now referred to as the "trilogy
cases" of Allgeyer v. Louisiana,"s St. Louis Cotton Compress Company v.
49 This bill will be discussed in some detail later in the article. See text accompanying
note 139 infr.
50 2 NAIC Proceedings 511 (1961).
51 North Little Rock Transp. Co.. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 181 F.2d 174. (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950), which upheld Arkansas' All-Industry Rate Law
as not violating the price fixing provision of the Sherman Act; see also Parmalee v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953) which upheld the substitute service
of process provision in the Florida Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
626.0503-0509 (1960).
52 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430 (1946).
53 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
54 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583 (1914).
55 165 U.S. 578 (1897). ,
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Arkansas" and Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. Johnson,57
focused upon the questions of (1) the place at which the elements or incidents
required to make a binding contract came into being, and (2) the place at which
the obligations under the insurance contract were to be performed. These
elements of formation, performance, and discharge became in varying com-
binations the core of the "conceptualistic" principle for determining whether a
transaction or series of transactions constituted "doing business," thereby sub-
jecting the foreign mail-order insurance company to the jurisdiction and regu-
lation of the state. Repeated utilization of the "conceptualistic" thesis in cases
involving foreign insurance corporations led the Supreme Court to conclude
in Minnesota Commercial Men's Association v. Benn that "an insurance cor-
poration is not doing business within a state merely because it insures lives of
persons living therein .... ,,18
C. State Interest in Insurance Contracts
The initial signs of change in the Supreme Court's attitude toward the
expansion of regulatory power to matters not wholly within the state came in
Osborn v. Ozlin.59 This case did not revive the in personam jurisdiction question
since the defendants were all registered or authorized" to transact insurance
business in the state and thereby "present" and doing business. The dispute
centered upon the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, contracts
covering risks located in Virginia, negotiated out-of-state by licensed, non-
resident agents. The defendant nonresident agents argued that the contracts,
were formed and to be performed outside Virginia and could not be subject to
Virginia regulations. The argument was similar to the one made in Connecticut
General Insurance Company v. Johnson."' In Connecticut General California
attempted to tax reinsurance contracts between two life insurance carriers. The
contracts were wholly negotiated and to be performed outside California; how-
ever, the reinsurance treaties affected California risks. The Court held the
California tax void under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The important factual distinction between Connecticut General and Osborn
is that in Connecticut General California was imposing a tax on an out-of-state
contract, while in Osborn Virginia was attempting to enforce a scheme of gen-
eral control over risks covered in the state by insurance contracts on the grounds
that the state had substantial interests in protecting risks on property located
in the state. The Virginia statute in question was designed to protect local
risks covered by out-of-state contracts sold by nonresident brokers by requiring
that resident agents be made a part of the transaction for the required "serv-
icing" of such casualty risks. For this the resident agent was to receive a part
of the commission paid to the nonresident broker.
56 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
57 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
58 261 U.S. 140, 145 (1923).
59 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
60 The suit was brought originally by the insurance company and its licensed agent.
Id. at 60.
61 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
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In Osborn, the Court formally recognized for the first time that out-of-
state insurance contracts can have realistic effects upon interests located within
the state, 2 and that the mere fact that state regulation may have "repercussions
beyond state lines" is not per se an unwarranted exercise of power by the state.63
The Court saw that a state can have "definable interests"64 in the business of
insurance totally transacted outside the state.
Shortly after the decision in Osborn, the Court heard Hoopeston Canning
Company v. Cullen,"5 and substantially reiterated the "interests" theory of
Osborn by recognizing that regardless of where the isolated factors of formation
or performance may take place, definite consequences arising from the contract
can affect interests within the state. It was said that "this interest may be
measured by highly realistic considerations such as the protection of the citizen
insured or the protection of the state from the incidents of loss." 66
When first viewed by the astute jurist, Osborn and Hoopeston must have
looked like a mutation from the traditional concept of due process as it related
to foreign corporations, since they were, in fact, a radical departure from the
"conceptualistic" approach used by the Court in earlier insurance due process
cases. Only after the Supreme Court's 1945 landmark decision in International
Shoe Company v. Washington" did it become obvious that Osborn and Hoopes-
ton were shades of things to come, and were not just distinguishable exceptions
made by the Court for the purpose of setting up a separate standard to aid the
states in the regulation of the interstate insurance business. International Shoe
weighed the aging concepts of due process and found them wanting in the bal-
ance of "substantial justice." From this now-famous and often-quoted decision
comes the equally famous "minimum contacts" rule:
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judge-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." 68 (Emphasis added;)
Substantial justice and fair play is, to say the least, a broad principle from
which to administer due process.69 However, the logic used to arrive at this new
principle was specific and properly directed at the shortcomings in the old
"presence" concept. "Presence," as previously defined, was deemed by the
Court to be something more than what was required for due process. Under
the new rule, "presence' extended to the activities "continuously" and "syste-
matically" carried on by the defendant within the state. With this liberalized
approach to due process, the Court laid to rest Pennoyer v. Neff"0 and the "con-
ceptualistic" theory developed in Allgeyer, and followed closely in St. Louis
62 Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 63 (1940).
63 Id. at 62.
64 Id. at 65.
65 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
66 Id. at 316.
67 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
68 Id. at 316.
69 See Justice Black's criticism of the new concept in a separate opinion, id. at 326.
70 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Cotton Compress, Connecticut General Insurance and Benn, because this theory
was predicated on the physical presence or voluntary consent alternatives estab-
lished in Pennoyer.
The first opportunity to apply the new concept of due process to the mail-
order insurance business came in Travelers Health Association v. Virginia.1
The Virginia Corporation Commission sought a cease and desist order against
a foreign insurance company to prevent it from making further sales in the
state until such time as the company became licensed to do business in the
state. Travelers Health Association, a Nebraska domiciled mail-order insurance
carrier, maintained its only office in Nebraska. It solicited new members, issued
certificates of insurance and paid claims through the use of the federal mails
only. The company contended that all of its business activities were conducted
outside Virginia and relied heavily on the conclusions reached in Minnesota
Commercial Men's Association v. Benn 2 a case following the "conceptualistic"
theory developed in Allgeyer, to support its position. It was pointed out by
Travelers that its business operation was identical to that of the Minnesota
Commercial Men's Association and, therefore, the Court should reach the
same conclusion as it did in the Benn case since Travelers was not present in
Virginia nor had it consented to service of process. To this the Court replied:
"Metaphysical concepts of implied consent and presence in a state should not
be solidified into a constitutional barrier against Virginia's simple, direct and
fair plan for service of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth."73 The
Court, citing Osborn, Hoopeston and International Shoe, reached the conclu-
sion that Travelers Health Association was properly served and was subject to
the administrative cease and desist proceedings. This decision is doubly impor-
tant to insurance regulators because it approves a form of substituted service of
process upon a nonlicensed mail-order insurer and, at the same time, holds
that such carriers are subject to regulatory proceedings.
Another significant case is Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Asso-
ciation." This case in the Fifth Circuit was a test of the Florida Unauthorized
Insurers Process Law,75 which in most respects is identical to the Unauthorized
Insurers Process Act designed and submitted by the subcommittee on un-
authorized insurers to the NAIC at its mid-winter meeting in 1951.76 Basically,
this statute gave to a Florida resident the power to bring an action by means
of substituted service against an unauthorized insurer when the action arises from
the contract of insurance. 7 Iowa State operated its mail-order business in much
71 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
72 261 U.S. 140 (1923).
73 Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950).
74 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953).
75 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.0503-0509 (1960).
76 NAIO Proceedings 165-68 (1951).
77 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.0505 (1960):
Any of the following acts in this state, effected by mail or otherwise, by an unauthor-
ized foreign or alien insurer: (1) the issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance
to residents of this state or to corporations authorized to do business therein; (2)
the solicitation of applications for such contracts; (3) the collection of premiums,
membership fees, assessments or other considerations for such contracts; or (4) any
other transaction of insurance, is equivalent to and shall constitute an appointment
by such insurer of the commissioner and his successors in office, to be its true and
[December, 1967]
[Vol. 43:157] UNAUTHORIZED MAIL-ORDER INSURANCE COMPANIES 167
the same manner as Minnesota Commercial Men's Association and Travelers
Health Association of Nebraska, and brought this action to have the substituted
service of process provision declared unconstitutional, contending that it violated
due process of law as secured by the fourteenth amendment. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, relying upon the constantly growing line
of precedents expanding the new concept of due process, held the statute and
the substituted service provided therein as sufficient to satisfy due process. 8
Since the force of the Florida statute is only upon suits arising out of the
contract, challenging its constitutionality would have no effect upon the Travel-
ers Health Association decision since that case related to the jurisdictional
powers of insurance commissioners over unauthorized insurers. The state insur-
ance regulator in situations illustrated by the Iowa State Traveling Men's Associ-
ation case acts only as an agent of the unauthorized insurer for the limited pur-
pose of receiving service.
Finally, in 1957, the Supreme Court ordered Texas to extend full faith and
credit to a sister state's judgment rendered against an unauthorized carrier
pursuant to a substituted form of service. In McGee v. International Life In-
surance Company"9 a claimant beneficiary to a life insurance contract, issued
to a resident of California by a mail-order insurer, brought an action on the
contract in a California court using that state's substituted service as provided
by statute. California's exercise of jurisdiction was affirmed as not having denied
due process to the respondent:
It is sufficient to say for purposes of due process that the suit was based
on a contract which had substantial connection with that state. . . . It
can not be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing ef-
fective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims. s0
IV. The Dual Standard for Regulation and Taxation of Insurance
A. Todd Shipyards Decision
Into the relatively clear and untroubled waters of realistic due process
standards, as they affect state power to regulate and tax insurance, the Supreme
Court thrust State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards."1 This case remuddied
the waters by giving new vitality to the old argument that Congress, through the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, intended to make such regulatory powers static and
fixed as they existed prior to the South-Eastern Underwriters decision.
This action was brought by the Texas State Board of Insurance against the
Todd Shipyards Corporation for failure to pay a premium tax established by
lawful attorney, upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action, suit,
or proceeding instituted by or on behalf of an insured or beneficiary, arising out
of any such contract of insurance; and any such act shall be signification of the
insurer's agreement that such service of process is of the same legal force and
validity as personal service of process in this state upon such insurer.
78 Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1953).
79 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
80 Id. at 223.
81 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
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statute 2 on insurance that the corporation had purchased from an unauthorized
alien insurance company."3 The Court, after meticulously setting forth the facts
surrounding the insurance transaction, 4 reverted to the "conceptualistic" theory
of doing business and held the statute unconstitutional. Relying almost totally
upon the House report that accompanied the McCarran-Ferguson Act to the
floor of the House, the majority applied the reasoning of the pre-South-Eastern
Underwriters trilogy 5 embracing the "conceptualistic" test for the establishment
of due process standards. It was the opinion of the Court that an "explicit, un-
equivocal"" intent was made manifest by Congress not to displace the trilogy,
Allgeyer, St. Louis Cotton Compress, and Connecticut General Insurance.
Briefly, your committee [Sub-Committee of the House] is of the opinion
that we should provide for the continued regulation and taxation of in-
surance by the States, subject always . . . to the limitations set out in the
controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, as, for instance,
in Allgeyer v. Louisiana... St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas...
and Connecticut General Insurance Co. v. Johnson ... which hold, inter
alia, that a State does not have power to tax contracts of insurance or
reinsurance entered into outside its jurisdiction .... 17 (Emphasis added.)
In concluding, the Court said:
Here Congress tailored the new regulations for the insurance business with
specific reference to our prior decisions. Since these earlier decisions are
part of the arch on which the new structure rests, we refrain from dis-
turbing them lest we change the design that Congress fashioned.8 8 (Emphasis
added.)
Although this was not the first time the Court had referred to this House
report, 9 it was the first time the Court ever applied the report to determine how
much power the McCarran-Ferguson Act gives the states and how much is re-
tained by Congress in the regulation and taxation of insurance.
82 T x. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 21.38, § 2(e) (1963):
If any person, firm, association or corporation shall purchase from an insurer not
licensed in Texas a policy of insurance covering risks within this state in a manner
other than through an insurance agent licensed . . . under the laws . . . of Texas,
such person . . . or corporation shall pay to the Board [of Insurance] a tax of five
per cent (5%) of the amount of the gross premiums paid by such insured for such
insurance.
83 The alien insurance company involved in this case was Lloyds of London which has
subsequent to the Todd Case become licensed to transact insurance business in Texas.
84 State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1962):
The insurance transactions involved in the present litigation take place entirely
outside Texas. The insurance, which is principally insurance against loss or liability
arising from damage to property, is negotiated and paid for outside Texas. The
policies are issued outside Texas. All losses arising under the policies are adjusted
and paid outside Texas. The insurers are not licensed to do business in Texas,
have no office . . . in Texas, do not solicit business in Texas, have no agents in
Texas, and do not investigate risks or claims in Texas.
The insured is not a domiciliary of Texas, but a New York Corporation doing
business in Texas. (Emphasis added.)
85 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); St. Louis Cotton
Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
86 State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451, 455 (1962).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 458.
89 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 431 (1946).
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B. Examination of the Todd Reasoning
It is extremely difficult to follow the Court's logic in Todd after the Inter-
national Shoe and Travelers Health Association cases, not to mention Osborn
and Hoopeston, even after recognizing the fact that none of these cases were
solely concerned with a tax question. However, this distinction alone should
be of small consequence, since the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the congressional
committee report were concerned with both regulation and taxation of in-
surance and spoke of each on equal terms. Neither the committee report nor
the bill itself conditioned one aspect of state power more than the other. Both
indicated that "regulation and taxation" should always be subject to the limita-
tions set out in the trilogy of Allgeyer, St. Louis Cotton Compress, and Con-
necticut General Insurance."
If the Court intended to bind itself to the "design that Congress fashioned,"'
'
it seems a bit late since the Court had ample opportunity to do so in Prudential
Insurance Company v. Benjamin92  and Travelers Health Association v.
Virginia." Each case dealt with insurance regulation, and each was concerned
with powers being exercised by insurance regulators that would violate the due
process concept developed in the trilogy cases. Yet no mention is made of either
case in Todd. Furthermore, how do Osborn and Hoopeston properly fit into
this revived atmosphere of "conceptualism"? The Court gave little consideration
to this point: "Here, unlike Osborn ... the insurance companies carry on no
activities within the State of Texas."'
Dismissing these important insurance cases with such a statement is merely
begging the question. The "activities" found in Osborn and Hoopeston were
merely a means to an end; the conclusion in each of these cases was reached only
after the Court decided to adjust the due process standards deemed necessary to
hold the insurer "doing business." What the Court failed to do in Todd was
to distinguish the two situations, if that in fact can be done, and explain why
it used one standard of due process for Osborn and another for Todd. It appears
that the decision in Todd has made a two-way street out of the "new structure"
upon which the Court rests the "arch" of prior conceptualistic decisions. Further
indication of the Court's failure to recognize that Congress did not distinguish
between regulation and taxation powers is evidenced by its making no attempt
to reconcile Todd with Travelers Health Association. One can only view the
Court's silence as an implied design to have one set of due process standards
for insurance regulation and quite another measure for insurance taxation.
C. Criticism of Todd
To criticize Todd is not necessarily to disagree with the Court's decision,
but rather to take issue with the method employed to reach that decision. Careful
examination of the facts surrounding the insurance transaction in that case, which
the Court set out in great detail, dearly indicates that it was doing something
90 H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945).
91 State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451, 458 (1962).
92 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
93 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
94 State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451, 453 (1962).
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more than establishing the grounds necessary to apply the "conceptualistic" test
of due process. If the concepts theory of Allgeyer concerns place of issue, de-
livery and place of performance of the contract, why was the Court so careful to
point out that the insurer had no office or place of business in Texas, had no
agents in the state, made no form of solicitation and did not investigate claims
or risks in Texas, and that there was in fact no contact or connection between
Texas and the insurance transaction except that the property covered was
located in Texas?95 All this sounds very similar to the Court's review of the
amount of "activity" carried on by a company within a state to determine
whether a given situation creates the "minimum contacts" necessary to satisfy due
process and "substantial justice." Had the Court applied the minimum contacts
standard instead of the concepts theory, it could just as easily have arrived at
the same conclusion, but more importantly, would not have disrupted the logical
scheme of insurance due process litigation.
This is precisely what the Court did do in the recently decided case of
National Bellas Hess, Incorporated v. Department of Revenue of Illinois."
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Stewart stated the facts con-
cerning the company's relationship with Illinois:
[National] does not maintain in Illinois any office, distribution house, sales
house, warehouse or any other place of business; it does not have in Illinois
any agent, salesman, canvasser, solicitor or . . .representative to sell or
take orders, to deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or to service
merchandise it sells; it does not own any tangible property, . . . it has not
advertised . . . in newspapers, on billboards, or by radio or television in
Illinois."
Although the point was somewhat belabored, the Court made it clear that it
could not find any contact between National and Illinois other than the use
of federal mails and common carriers. Upon these facts, the Court held that
usage of the mails and common carriers in the course of interstate business was
insufficient contact to find National "doing business" in Illinois. Therefore, the
use tax imposed by statute upon Illinois citizens who purchased from National
through the mails, created an "unjustifiable local entanglement"9 " constituting
a burden on interstate commerce. The Court, relying upon the logic of Wisconsin
v. J. C. Penney Company,99 felt that since Illinois gave nothing to National or
to Illinois citizens in the way of protection, the state therefore could not ask for
anything in return. Perhaps the Court finds taxation without regulation to
be tyranny.
A vigorous and penetrating dissent was filed by Justices Fortas, Black and
Douglas. In essence, the dissenters believed that the "nexus test" developed in
Miller Brothers Company v. Maryland0 should have controlled in National.
The "nexus test" is simply viewing the activities of the company and determining
95 Id. at 454-55.
96 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
97 Id. at 754 (quoting from the Illinois Supreme Court opinion in the same case, 34 Ill.
2d 164, 166-67, 214 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1966)).
98 Id. at 760.
99 311 U.S. 435-44 (1940).
100 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
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if by its business procedures the company regularly and continuously engages
in "exploitation of the consumer market."1 1 Although Maryland's imposition of
a tax was struck down, the dissent distinguished the facts of Miller Brothers from
National, pointing out that the patrons of Miller Brothers Department Store,
located in Delaware, went across state lines to purchase merchandise which was
later shipped or delivered by common carrier into Maryland, while the National
Bellas Hess Company systematically and regularly mailed catalogues into Illinois
for the purpose of exploiting the Illinois consumer market.
Consider the parallel in the facts between Todd and Miller Brothers and
then superimpose the "nexus test" of Miller Brothers upon the Todd situation,
remembering that in Todd the insured went to the insurer for their casualty
and liability coverage. It becomes elementary, assuming the Court remained
consistent, that it would have reached the same decision as it did in Todd but
without going against the current test for determining whether due process has
been met.
In summary, the Supreme Court, while reaching the proper decision in
Todd by using the wrong approach, did apply the proper approach in National
Bellas Hess but arrived at the wrong conclusion. It would seem that the
insurer's total lack of "contacts" with Texas in Todd is sufficient to distinguish
that case from the mail-order insurance cases; however, Todd did a great deal
to disturb the relatively settled arguments about static pre-South-Eastern Under-
writers regulation powers. In view of Ministers Life and Casualty Union v.
Haase,"2 it appears that Todd will be restricted to its particular fact situation.
V. Ministers Life & Casualty v. Haase-The New Trend
Ministers Life was the first significant insurance litigation after Todd
which tested the limit of state insurance commissioners' powers. This action,
brought by a Minnesota domiciled mail-order insurance company and financed
by three trade associations, was to test the constitutionality of the Wisconsin
Unauthorized Insurers Act adopted in 1961.
A. The Wisconsin Unauthorized Insurance Act. v. The NAIC
Unauthorized Insurers Process Act
To understand how the Ministers decision, in affirming the Wisconsin act,
expanded the regulatory powers of state insurance supervisors over that intended
by the Model Process Act, it is important to note the basic differences between
the two acts." 3 The Model Process Act, as recommended in 1948104 and re-
recommended in 1951,"05 was designed, as its name implies, only to establish
a satisfactory form of substitute service upon mail-order insurers in actions arising
out of the contracts made by such insurers with citizens in states where the
company was not authorized to do business. The Wisconsin acte" aims at more
101 Id. at 347 (dissenting opinion).
102 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
103 Wisconsin Unauthorized Insurance Act shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Wis-
consin Act." The Unauthorized Insurers Process Act shall hereinafter be referred to as the
"Model Process Act."
104 NAIC Proceedings 315-16 (1949).
105 NAIC Proceedings 165 (1951).
106 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 201.42 (Supp. 1967).
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than just the general protection of its citizens after contracts have been made
with such companies. It is designed to subject the company to all the insurance
laws of the state in order to prevent the unwarranted abuses generally attributed
to mail-order business. It declares unlawful any of the described acts of doing
an insurance business as set out in the statute, "whether effected by mail or
otherwise," unless the company is authorized by the insurance commissioner
to so act. Venue of an act committed by mail is at the point where the matter
is delivered and takes effect. °7 Fundamentally, the Wisconsin act is a form
of preventative medicine not previously tried by any state, and it actually makes
unauthorized insurance sales or solicitations by any company, mail-order or
otherwise, illegal.
While the Model Process Act provided for one situation in which sub-
stituted service was appropriate,' the Wisconsin act provides for two. The
first is identical in form and intent to that of the Model Process Act (actions
based upon the contract of insurance); the second is based upon the mail-order
insurers doing "any act... as set forth"'0 9 in the Act which amounts to "doing
the business of insurance." Such actions constitute the appointment of the Secre-
tary of State as process agent in suits or administrative actions brought by the
insurance commissioner or the state." By this method Wisconsin can do for
107 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 201.42(2) (a) (Supp. 1967):
Any of the following acts in this state effected by mail or otherwise is defined
to be doing an insurance business in this state. The venue of an act committed
by mail is at the point where the matter transmitted by mail is delivered and takes
effect. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "insurer" as used in this section
includes all corporations, associations, partnerships and individuals engaged as
principals in the business of insurance and also includes interinsurance exchanges
and mutual benefit societies.
1. The making of or proposing to make, as an insurer, an insurance contract.
2. The making of or proposing to make, as guarantor or surety, any contract
of guaranty or suretyship as a vocation and not merely incidental to any other
legitimate business or activity of the guarantor or surety.
3. The taking or receiving of any application for insurance.
4. The receiving or collection of any premium, commission, membership fees,
assessments, due or other consideration for any insurance or any part thereof.
5. The issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of this state
or to persons authorized to do business in this state.
6. Directly or indirectly acting as an agent for or otherwise representing or
aiding on behalf of another any person or insurer in the solicitation, negotiation,
procurement or effectuation of insurance or renewals thereof or in the dissemina-
tion as to coverage or rates, or forwarding of applications, or delivery of policies
or contracts, or inspection of risks, a fixing of rates or investigation or adjustment
of claims or losses or in the transaction of matters subsequent to effectuation of
the contract and arising out of it, or in any other manner presenting or assisting a
person or insurer in the transaction of insurance with respect to subjects of insur-
ance resident, located or to be performed in this state. The provisions of this sub-
division shall not operate to prohibit full-time salaried employees of a corporate
insured from acting in the capacity of an insurance manager or buyer in placing
insurance in behalf of such employer.
7. The doing of any kind of insurance business specifically recognized as con-
stituting the doing of an insurance business within the meaning of the statutes
relating to insurance.
8. The doing or proposing to do any insurance business in substance equiva-
lent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the provisions of the
statutes.
9. Any other transactions of business in this state by an insurer.
108 Section 2. Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, NAIC Proceedings 166 (1951).
109 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 201.42(4) (a) (Supp. 1967).
110 Id.
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its citizens everything that was intended under the Model Process Act and con-
siderably more, i.e., it can enforce all the state statutes and regulations governing
and controlling the business of insurance in Wisconsin. This procedure enables
the insurance commissioner to act on behalf of the state to protect its citizens
when it is discovered that some unscrupulous carrier, using questionable claims
or sales practices, is exploiting the citizenry. Likewise, any insurance company
unable to meet the state's financial requirements for insurers can be prevented
from contacting the public by use of the mails. In so acting, the state can prevent
widespread harm before it becomes measurable. It is far more realistic to place
this power with the state, since it already has the duty to regulate insurance,
than to provide only the "self-help" right of action granted in the Model
Process Act to the individual citizen who may be harmed by a particular in-
surance carrier's refusal to honor the terms of a contract.
The final distinction between the two acts is in the area of taxation. Whereas
the Model Process Act levies no tax, the Wisconsin act exacts a premium receipts
tax of three percent on gross premiums charged Wisconsin residents by mail-
order companies."' This is done on the premise that taxation of such com-
panies helps to maintain an equitable distribution of the costs of regulation.
In effect, the Wisconsin act makes no distinction between authorized and
unauthorized companies as far as the exercise of regulatory power and taxation
is concerned. The law does require, however, that any acts of doing an insurance
business if done by an unauthorized mail-order company, constitute a violation
of the law subjecting such violator to severe fines." 2
B. The Ministers Life & Casualty Operation in Wisconsin
Ministers, originally a traveling men's association selling to an exclusive
group of traveling salesmen, was in its sixty-fourth year of business at the time
the litigation began in Wisconsin.1 The company was not licensed and had no
agents in Wisconsin; all solicitation of new business was either on a direct-mail
basis, or through advertisements in national and religious publications. The com-
pany paid all claims from its home office, and notices of premiums due were
sent by mail from the home office in Minnesota. It had no office in Wisconsin
nor did it directly own any property there. On the other hand, Ministers had
a large volume of annual mail contact with the state's citizens.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court immediately posed the issue of whether
this "continuous and systematic... business conduct... [is] so related to the
purpose of regulation and bears such relationship to Wisconsin in respect to the
state's interest in such activity and the subject of insurance that [Wisconsin]
111 Id. at § 201.42 (11) (a).
112 Id. at § 201.42 (13)(a), (b).
113 The company is no longer an association; it is now a mutual legal reserve life com-
pany competing unconditionally in the life insurance market place.
114 General mailing is sent to between 60,000 and 140,000 eligible persons some six
times a year and a special mailing to between 6,000 and 8,000 selected individuals
approximately 12 times a year. In Wisconsin approximately 25,000 mail solicita-
tions are made annually to approximately 3,600 residents. Ministers Life & Cas.
Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287, 289 (1966).
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may regulate and tax it?""' 5 After stating the issue, the court systematically
proceeded to dissect the claims made by Ministers in support of its contention
that the Wisconsin act was unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated both
the commerce clause and the due process dause." 6
C. Ministers on the Commerce Clause
The main thrust of the insurance company's argument was directed at
subsection three of the Wisconsin act that prohibits unauthorized mail-order
insurers from continuing to operate by use of the mails unless the company be-
comes licensed to do an insurance business in Wisconsin."'7 It was Ministers'
position that the statute created a "new power" never before possessed by state
regulators and that the power went beyond the intent of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Ministers contended that the McCarran-Ferguson Act fixed or froze the
amount and extent of state insurance regulation at the level of the pre-South-
Eastern Underwriters decisions, and that any exercise of an expanded regulatory
program amounted to usurpation of authority reserved to Congress, thus violating
the commerce clause. Ministers was not attacking the constitutionality of the
new concepts of due process and their development, but merely said that they
should not apply to insurance cases since such application would grant power
to the states not authorized in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The court indicated that it was impossible to make a "practical difference" ' 8
between an application of "dated" due process standards and the limited or
frozen power interpretation that Ministers puts on the McCarran-Ferguson Act
in developing its commerce clause argument. Both arguments led to the same
place because what was really to be decided was whether Ministers was doing
business in Wisconsin, and if it was, then due process was satisfied. The real
question centered on the standards to be applied in making that determination.
Finding no contention on the part of Ministers challenging the basic power of the
states to regulate insurance, but only a dispute as to "how much" power was
possessed by the states, the court dismissed the commerce clause objection by
briefly reviewing Paul v. Virginia,"' United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Association,"' and the McCarran-Ferguson Act as each established the
relationship between state regulation of insurance and the commerce clause.
The court concluded its discussion with a quotation from Prudential Insurance
Company v. Benjamin: "['Congress] put the full weight of its power behind
existing and future state legislation to sustain it from any attack under the com-
merce clause .... ,12
115 Ministers Life & Cas. Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287, 290 (1966).
116 Id. at 291.
117 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 201.42(3) (Supp. 1967).
118 Ministers Life & Cas. Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287, 291 (1966).
119 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
120 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
121 Ministers Life & Cas. Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287, 292 (1966).
(1966).
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D. Ministerson the Todd Case
Although Ministers relied heavily upon the reasoning in Todd to support
its position that state power to regulate and tax insurance was frozen at the
level of the pre-South-Eastern Underwriters cases, the court did not find its
argument persuasive. The Wisconsin court found the decision in Todd to stem
from extraordinary circumstances and was quick to point out that there were
"no contacts" of any nature by the insurer in Todd, and that this was a
decisive factor in the outcome of the case. The court felt that Todd had merely
used the trilogy to establish the "outer limits" '122 of the requirements of due
process. The new concepts of due process were not overruled in Todd; in fact,
they were not really discussed. Thus, the court in Ministers interpreted Todd
to have applied Allgeyer, St. Louis Cotton Compress and Connecticut General
primarily because of the similarity in the fact situations. The use of these cases
was not an unequivocal embrace of the old standard over the new concept of
due process.
We think the outer limits of the vital and ever-growing standards of due
process were defined in Todd to be the holdings in a trilogy of cases,
but we do not read Todd as freezing state regulation to the type then
extant and as forever barring within these outer limits the expansion of
the regulation of the insurance industry by states to meet the ever-growing
social needs and problems of modem civiliZation.12s
Recognizing the presence of multiple standards, concepts or tests to establish
due process which can effectively co-exist within the "outer limits" of Allgeyer's
"contacts concept" and Benn's "presence theory" of "doing business," the court
in Ministers made the test dependent upon the individual fact situation. Perhaps
it is more than just facts that determine the test? It would appear that the par-
ticular category drawn into question through the litigation, i.e., regulation-
tax-protection, could well be the determining factor in deciding what standards
of due process will be applied.
The Ministers court pointed out another very important reason why the
Todd case used Allgeyer, St. Louis Cotton Compress, and Connecticut General:
these three cases were specifically cited by Congress at the time they passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act as a "for instance" example of the framework within
which insurance regulation should be kept. Since the trilogy was only a "for
instance" guide,' these cases were not exclusive; other pre-South-Eastern
Underwriters cases such as Osborn and Hoopeston, embodying the "activities,"
"consequences" and "substantial interests" test to establish due process, could be
applied. The Wisconsin court observed that Todd did not overrule Osborn or
Hoopeston, and in fact, the Court in Todd "might well have reached the same
result on the facts, applying the Osborn-Hoopeston philosophy."'
125
This analysis of Todd by the Wisconsin Supreme Court would seem to
effectively eliminate that case as a controlling force in mail-order insurance liti-
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451, 455 (1962).
125 Ministers Life & Gas. Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287, 293 (1966).
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gation involving due process. Todd through Ministers is now severely restricted
to its specific fact situation.
E. Ministers on Benn
The other major case employed by Ministers to advance its position was
Minnesota Commercial Men's Association v. Benn, 28  a pre-South-Eastern
Underwriters decision declaring mail-order insurers not present and not doing
business in a state by application of the contacts concept of due process as de-
veloped by the trilogy. For years, this decision has been cited successfully by
mail-order carriers as the controlling case exempting them from state regulation.
Benn was an obvious and logical citation in Ministers' argument, for if Todd
did in fact affirm the concept of frozen regulatory powers at the pre-South-
Eastern Underwriters level, then the only standards and powers that could pres-
ently be exercised by the states would be those developed and granted before
South-Eastern Underwriters. Ministers contended that Minnesota Commercial's
method of operation, which had been declared not "doing business," was con-
trolling because (1) it embraced a pre-South-Eastern Underwriters concept of
due process for insurance cases involving jurisdictional questions, and (2) for
all intents and purposes the method of business used by Minnesota Commercial
was identical to Ministers' procedure in Wisconsin. 2 7
But since the court did not find the frozen or limited powers theory of
insurance regulation a palatable argument, it was therefore obvious that it would
not confine itself to an application of the "presence concept" of Benn as the
only possible standard of due process for insurance litigation involving jurisdic-
tional questions.
Benn's "presence concept" of doing business may be conceded to no longer
have vitality in the field of jurisdiction for service of process in view of
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington ... whose minimum-contact theory
of jurisdiction was proclaimed only a few years after the decision in
Osborn and Hoopeston in the related field of states' jurisdiction to tax
and regulate.128
F. Ministers on Osborn and Hoopeston
After total rejection of Ministers' position, the court indicated that it found
Osborn and Hoopeston to be "sufficient authority for Wisconsin's jurisdiction
to regulate the type of insurance business presented by the instant facts ....
Both cases.. involved state insurance regulatory jurisdictional questions of due
process, and both held that the great public interest involved, as well as the
126 261 U.S. 140 (1923).
127 Neither company had any physical contacts with the state in which they were being
sued except through the use of the federal mails. The only distinction between the two
companies was that Ministers was no longer an association, as was Commercial Men's Associa-
tion, but had converted to a mutual legal reserve life insurance company.
128 Ministers Life & Cas. Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287, 294 (1966).
129 Id.
130 See text accompanying notes 59-80.
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realistic future consequences that evolve from insurance contracts regardless of
how or where negotiated, made it the business of the state to protect its citizens
and their property by regulation of the industry.
Ministers turned upon the Court's application of the prevailing limits of
due process initiated and developed by Osborn and other current insurance
regulation cases rather than tax cases such as Todd and Connecticut General.
It found the fact situation in Ministers to be closer to those involved in Osborn
and Hoopeston than that involved in Todd. But, although the court spent some
time outlining facts and the valtie of facts in determining jurisdictional questions,
it made it clear that facts were only a means to an end, the end being the
proper choice and application of the standards or tests of due process. The
court felt mail-order contact on a large scale such as in Ministers was a systematic
and continuous method of "doing business," and that the law should treat it
as such: "In common parlance and in any enlightened sense, it cannot be said
that Ministers does not do business in Wisconsin."''
By pointing out the need to examine the facts of each case to determine
the proper application of a due process test, the court was skating on very thin
ice. It could not have been the close similarity of facts, as the court indicated,
that made them select Osborn and Hoopeston as the foundation for the decision,
for the fact situation in the rejected Benn case was also identical to that in
Ministers. Rather, it appears that it was the objective of the statute in question
that made Osborn and Hoopeston more appealing than Benn or Todd. Benn,
as we have seen, was based on two thirds of the trilogy, one decision of which
held a statute unconstitutional because it imposed premium taxes on out-of-state
contracts without any attempt to regulate and protect, 13 2 while the other struck
down a statute imposing a fine upon Louisiana citizens for making insurance
contracts out of the state that affected Louisiana property owned by the citizen. 3
These two cases of the trilogy, as did the Todd and Connecteut General opinions,
dealt with statutes that made no attempt nor displayed any appreciable interest
in protecting the citizens of the state through insurance regulation. The pur-
pose of each statute was only to provide the state with a form of taxation when
it had no basic interest in the regulation of the business being taxed.
On the other hand, Osborn and Hoopeston attempted to enforce a scheme
of general control over insurance contracts covering risks within the state, and
the primary purpose of the statute in each of these cases was determined to be
the protection of the citizenry. In the instant case, the court found Ministers
to be an operation affecting risks within the state by its systematic mail-order
contacts with Wisconsin, and Osborn and Hoopeston provided the vehicle or
"test" by which the Wisconsin insurance regulators could be permitted to reg-
ulate this unauthorized mail-order company without violating the due process
clause.
131 Ministers Life & Cas. Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287, 295 (1966).
132 St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
133 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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G. Summary
The enactment of the Wisconsin Unauthorized Insurance Act and the re-
sultant litigation caused by its enforcement accomplished much to resolve the
long-standing clash between two powerful interests with conflicting opinions
on how one segment of the insurance industry should be operated. Ministers
represents the insurance regulator's ultimate victory in the continuous war waged
between state control and the mail-order insurers; it might well turn out to be
the last major battle between these two formidable opponents. Although there
may be more tests of the "new power" by mail-order companies not yet con-
vinced of the changing tide,"" it would appear safe to say that the days of the
unauthorized mail-order company are limited.
Ministers has settled the dispute that has raged since the passage of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act over what the intent of Congress was toward future
state regulation of insurance. It has unequivocally repudiated the "frozen
powers" concept by saying this is not what Todd represented, and if it did, it
cannot effectively co-exist in an atmosprere of vital and adequate state regulation.
If Congress intended the states to regulate this business, and do a proper job,
it could not have been so nearsighted as to create a paradox by limiting the
regulator to a fixed and rigid set of powers with which to meet the problems in
a world of changing ideas and concepts. Ministers recognizes the problems of
the regulator and pushes aside the dated arguments advanced to impede the
state regulator from doing an adequate job.
This case is also important because it clears the legal air of all the questions
and implications raised by the Todd case. It puts the due process in regulation
and tax litigation back into its proper perspective by explaining Todd and the
"arch" upon which it rests as the "outer limits" within which can comfortably
fit other tests and measures of due process necessary to keep pace with changes.
From the regulators' point of view, the most important ramification of this
decision is its holding constitutional a statute that in effect says that if you want
to "mess around" in our state you had better be licensed and authorized to so
act; and if you refuse, we have the power to prevent your continued actvity
in this state. In essence, the Wisconsin approach puts everyone doing business
in that state, regardless of their marketing methods, on equal terms. This ensures
a fair and competitive market with equal observance and protection of the laws
for all.
VI. Developments since Ministers
A. State Legislation
Since the passage of the Wisconsin act, eighteen additional states" have
passed or considered passage of new legislation designed to expand state control
134 See, e.g., People v. United Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 427 P.2d 199, 58 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1967).
135 California, Minnesota, Michigan and Oregon passed new statutes more comprehensive
than the Model NAIC Unauthorized Insurers Process Act shortly after Wisconsin's action.
Iowa, Texas, Colorado, Florida and West Virginia adopted broader laws for dealing with
unauthorized insurers' violations during their respective 1967 legislative sessions. The Ohio,
Vermont, Alaska and Alabama departments presented some form of new legislation but at
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over unauthorized mail-order companies.' All but a few of these states made
no serious attempt to broaden their laws until 1967. Wisconsin-type legislation
did not become immediately popular among state regulators because (1) all the
states had adopted some form of law substantially patterned after the Model
Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, and (2) the Wisconsin law was a radical
departure from the Model Act and had not been established as constitutional
as had the Model Act."7 It was only after the Ministers case that regulators
began to give consideration to the use of such an approach to the problem.
Four major types of legislation have evolved over the last six years, two
approaches as recent as 1967."8' The oldest is the approach of the NAIC which
predates Ministers by some ten years.' It was the approach taken by California
in 1961 when it passed the model NAIC Unauthorized Insurers False Adver-
tising Process Act. It was designed to complement and to work in conjunction
with the already existing model Unauthorized Insurers Process Act. The two
statutes combined give the insured an opportunity to obtain substituted service
on such carriers by serving the insurance commissioner and also allow the in-
surance department to obtain jurisdiction over unauthorized companies by
authorizing an employee of the department to serve the commissioner. This
approach, however, limits department action to administrative proceedings only,-
and further limits the scope of the hearing primarily to the subject of false and
misleading advertising. If after the hearing it is determined that the company
is in violation of the law, the statute provides only one remedy to the regulator,
a cease and desist order. Judicial appeal is available to both parties.
This approach is considerably more confining than the Wisconsin law that
requires licensing and compliance with all insurance laws and regulations as
a prerequisite to doing business, and also makes available to the commissioner all
the legal, equitable and administrative forms of redress if an unauthorized carrier
violates the laws or attempts to conduct business in the state without authoriza-
tion. It is questionable whether the NAIC-California approach, which was
born of compromise, actually works to prevent the various kinds of abuses
attributed to the unauthorized carrier.
The Illinois Insurance Department designed a bill which is a variation of
the Wisconsin theme. The bill 4 0 was introduced on March 8, 1967, by Rep-
resentative Yourell and became known as the Illinois approach. It requires any
company doing any of the acts defined in the bill as an insurance business to
the time of this article it was either pending in committee or voted to be carried over to
the 1968 session. Maryland, North Dakota, Illinois and New Mexico presented plans to their
legislatures in 1967 but the bills died in committee.
136 It was pointed out earlier in this article, text accompanying note 50 supra, that all
the states have adopted the Model NAIC recommended legislation which provides to an
insured the right to maintain an action on the contract of insurance. The service is a sub-
stituted form much the same as provided in the nonresident motorist service of process
statutes held constitutional in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The additional
legislation discussed in note 135 supra, was either patterned after the Wisconsin law or a
variation of that law.
137 Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953).
138 The Wisconsin approach, the NAIC approach, the Iowa approach and the Illinois
approach.
139 NAIC Proceedings 165-71 (1951).
140 H.B. 750, Ill. Reg. Sess. (1967).
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become licensed. 1 The acts defined as doing business are almost identical to
the acts constituting the transaction of insurance business under the Wisconsin
statute.'42 Violations are punishable by fine and are to be recovered by the
county attorney in the county where such violation took place. 4 ' Failure by the
company to comply with the law does not invalidate or impair the contracts
made by the company while in violation of the law; however, the company is
not permitted to maintain any action in equity or law to enforce any right,
claim or demand arising out of such contracts.' 4 The only power granted the
commissioner of insurance by this proposed law is the power to obtain an in-
junction against such unauthorized carriers for violation of the law.4 5
This approach, although resembling the Wisconsin law in purpose, is ex-
tremely restrictive in the remedies available to the insurance regulator. Perhaps
injunctive relief is sufficient to prevent unauthorized carriers from acting within
a state but there are occasions when other action can be more effective and
simpler. It seems advantageous to have all the legal and equitable remedies,
plus administrative hearings, available to deal with each situation as it occurs.
On July 1, 1967 House File 312,46 as amended and passed by the Iowa
Sixty-second General Assembly, became law. Although it resembles the Wis-
consin approach in many respects, it represents in part a refinement of that
statute insofar as it was designed to be directed only at the unauthorized mail-
order business. Such was the intent of Wisconsin; however, observation and
hindsight disclosed that other areas of the industry, because of certain marketing
techniques, would technically be included in the Wisconsin law. Iowa, recog-
nizing these situations, attempted to exclude them from the provisions of the
mail-order law by specific exemption. 1 ' Iowa, for instance, was not interested
in including the large industrial buyers in the new act, particularly when those
buyers went to some foreign or alien carrier not licensed in Iowa to purchase
their property and liability insurance. This is basically the Todd situation and
Iowa, remembering that case, recognized the distinction between an unauthorized
carrier continuously using the mails to solicit its general citizenry and the carrier
who is approached by a large industrial buyer located in Iowa. Iowa felt that
such highly sophisticated buyers do not need nor in fact desire the protection
of the state in their insurance transactions, and for this reason, exempted this
situation from coverage under the act. Such an exemption does not appear in
the Wisconsin statute. Close examination of the two bills will disclose other
situations excluded by the Iowa law that are outside the realm of mail-order
carriers yet are forms of business that have "contacts" with the state and would
technically be included in the Wisconsin statute; Iowa, however, did not feel that
these situations warranted the regulation provided in the new statute.
141 Id. at § 121: "It is unlawful for any company to enter into a contract of insurance
as an insurer or to transact insurance business in this State as set forth in subsection (2) of
this Section, without a certificate of authority from the Director ......
142 Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 201. 4 2(2)(a) (Supp. 1967).
143 H.B. 750, Ill. Reg. Sess. § 121(3) (1967).
144 Id. at 121(4).
145 Id. at 121.1.
146 House File 312, Iowa Reg. Sess. (1967).
147 House File 312, Iowa Reg. Sess. § 5(5)-(9) (1967).
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B. Subsequent Litigation
On May 4, 1967, the Supreme Court of California handed down People
v. United Life Insurance Company,"8 a case that consolidated three separate
actions brought by the California Insurance Department in the name of the
people of California. All three companies 4 9 involved as defendants solicited
and negotiated their insurance transactions "with California residents exclusively
by mail from offices outside this state."'9 0 The interesting difference between
this case and Ministers is the way in which the California Insurance Department
brought the action. Instead of using the specific statutes designated for the
control of unauthorized mail-order carriers,'' the department based its power
to regulate and control such companies on the "general powers" vested in the
insurance commissioner to bring an action in the name of the people of Cali-
fornia whenever he had sufficient evidence to believe "that any person is vio-
lating or about to violate any provisions of this code .... "1s2 The provision
of the insurance code "believed" violated was section 700,'s" requiring a license
to transact business. Over the objections of the defendants that specific controls
took precedence over general controls, the court held that California could
constitutionally regulate such companies through application of the general
powers and controls vested in the commissioner of insurance.
Most of the case dealt with the defendants' argument that due process
had not been met and, therefore, that California could not constitutionally
regulate the type of business carried on by the three defendants.
Through Justice Sullivan, the court presented an erudite opinion on the
developing and expanding concepts of due process as they exist within the
framework of state insurance regulation. The case is an excellent review of
the history of due process as it relates to state regulation. It covers the entire
gambit of cases starting with Paul v. Virginia' and ending with Ministers Life
& Casualty Union v. Haase.5 Considerable attention was given to examination
of the pre-McCarran-Ferguson Act due process cases, 95 and the conclusion
was that in re-examining these opinions the California Court saw "two separate
yet consistent trends"' 57 established by these cases:
The first, exemplified by the earlier trilogy of cases . . .emphasized the
148 427 P.2d 199, 58 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1967).
149 United National Life Insurance Company, licensed and incorporated in Arizona;
Pioneer Life Insurance Company, licensed and incorporated in Illinois; and National
Liberty Life Insurance Company, licensed and incorporated in Pennsylvania. See id. at 201,
58 Cal. Rptr. 601.
150 Id.
151 Actions Against Nonadmitted Insurers, CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-20; and the Unauthor-
ized Insurers False Advertising Process Act, CAL. INs. CODE §§ 1620.1-1620.7.
152 CAL. INS. CODE § 12928.6.
153 CAL. INS. CODE § 700: "A person shall not transact any class of insurance business
in this state without first being admitted for such class ......
154 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
155 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
156 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943); Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S.
53 (1940); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); St. Louis
Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897).
157 People v. United Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 427 P.2d 199, 207; 58 Cal. Rptr. 599, 607
(1967).
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place of making the contract sought to be taxed or regulated and, having
found all activities relevant to the making and carrying out of the contract
to have occurred outside the regulating state, invalidated all efforts of the
latter to control them. The second, exemplified by the later cases of
Osborn and Hoopeston, laid emphasis on the contacts with the regulating
state arising from the transactions involved and the interest of the state
in such transactions consequent upon such relationship. . . .We say that
these trends of decision are consistent because upon analysis the first
category of cases actually represents situations where there were no contacts
sufficient to support the jurisdiction of the regulating state.
We have therefore concluded that within the framework of the Mc-
Carran Act and in accordance with principles of due process prior thereto,
interstate insurance transactions may properly be regulated when they have
sufficient contacts with the regulating state so as to give the latter a sub-
stantial interest in the transaction.1 5 (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the court assumed the companies' argument that
the decision must rest upon pre-McCarran-Ferguson Act concepts. But the court
found that more than one concept existed at that time and chose to apply one
test over the other, in the instant case, because sufficient contacts created state
interest in the companies' activities. In so acting, however, the courts may have
given unintentional credence to the "frozen powers" doctrine so clearly dispelled
in Ministers.
The other interesting contribution made by this case is the court's finding
that the general powers and controls granted the insurance commissioner to
regulate the business are a sufficient basis for the exercise of control over any
person engaged in the business of insurance. In effect then, this case, if upheld
by the United States Supreme Court, makes unnecessary the need for specific
power grants to control unauthorized mail-order business.
VIII. Conclusion
It is clear that the courts have found that the power to regulate and tax
the business of insurance rests with the states. It is a delegated authority subject
to recall by Congress if the several states do not fulfill the "adequacy" condition
set forth in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Constant awareness of current prob-
lems affecting the public and a firm purpose to develop workable solutions to
these problems is the only way the regulator can justify his existence. As it
was so aptly stated in the National case, "[t]he insurance industry is regulated
primarily for the benefit of those who make use of the services the industry
offers."' 59
But it can also be stated at this point that due process as it evolved in the
context of insurance regulation has developed a dual personality: one set of
tests or standards is applied if the regulator is attempting to regulate or, in reg-
ulating, incidentally taxes the regulated, but an entirely different set of due
process standards is employed if he only attempts to tax an insurance transaction.
If the legal birth of state regulation began with Paul v. Virginia, at least
158 Id.
159 Id. at 214, Cal. Rptr. at 614.
[December, 1967]
[Vol. 43:157] UNAUTHORIZED MAIL-ORDER INSURANCE COMPANIES 183
the feud between the regulators and the unauthorized carriers was ended with
Ministers and National. Perhaps the conflict was symptomatic of an era in
which aging concepts, conceived in simpler times and with little regard for the
social side effects, had to be forever discarded for a form of adequate regulation
to protect more complex interests in a more comingled world. The Ministers
case undoubtedly ends the day of uncontrolled mail-order insurance, and in all
likelihood, the next decade will find no mail-order carriers operating in any
state in which they are not licensed to do business.
